On the Subject of Animal Rights
One of the things Peter Singer expressed dismay about me, was that I eat meat. The subject of the debate, however, was not “Eating animals is immoral.” Instead, it was, “Abortion is immoral.” One could be a vegan, or one could be a meat eater, but both types of people could still come to the conclusion that abortion is immoral because we ought not kill innocent humans, particularly our own offspring.
Further, on a technical level, when someone says, “Human lives matter,” it doesn’t follow that “Animal lives don’t matter.” By way of analogy, if someone says, “Black lives matter,” it doesn’t follow that that person is declaring, “Latino lives don’t matter.”
If someone wants to protect animals as well as humans, they can. I think, for example, of Bindi Irwin, the daughter of the late “Crocodile Hunter” Steve Irwin. Bindi is known as a “wildlife warrior” who works at the Australian Zoo. Her love for animals is strong, but so is her love for her pre-born child. Bindi announced her pregnancy in the first trimester and has made various posts on social media about how much she loves her yet-to-be-born daughter.
So if Peter Singer wants to protect animals as well as humans, fine. What is troubling, however, is that he protects animals but not all humans.
Moreover, Peter argues that to protect humans because they’re human, and to not protect animals, is to be guilty of speciesism, which is, to him, as morally troubling as, for example, racism.
First, consider that the non-human species that Peter protects can be guilty of speciesism. Many species prioritize their own over another (think, for example, of the cougar mentioned previously in this series who prioritized her own babies over a human, or consider that a whale eats fish and that chimpanzees eat meat). Is Peter going to lecture these beings for their consumption of other animals?
Second, Peter protects beings (whether humans or not) that are conscious, rational, self-aware, and have desires. Notice that his criteria is not limitless; it is still exclusive. Plus, while his criteria of who gets protection may extend beyond some humans, it nonetheless is criteria that humans have. He’s therefore picking qualities for “moral standing” or “personhood” that are present in our species (and some others, but not all others) so he’s guilty of a degree of speciesism, too. By selecting criteria that involves intellectual capabilities but not, for example, something like having alligator skin, is to be guilty of speciesism (he just favors a number of species over others, instead of one over others).
Third, the criteria Peter has selected for personhood are actually qualities pre-born humans do have—they just cannot act on those qualities yet due to their age. By way of analogy, consider one way a dog is different from a cat: The canine nature involves barking and the feline nature involves meowing. And yet, it’s possible to have a dog that cannot bark or a cat that cannot meow. If the dog cannot bark, is it not a dog? It is obviously still a dog, and it has the inherent capacity, by virtue of its canine nature, to bark; however, due to developmental problems or some intentional intervention, the dog simply cannot manifest a bark. Likewise, pre-born humans, by virtue of their human nature, have the inherent capacity to be conscious, rational, self-aware, and have desires; however, because they haven’t lived long enough they haven’t yet manifested those capacities to their fullness.
The same could be said, by the way, about newborn children—they have the inherent capacities an adult manifests, but due to their age they cannot yet act on them. If you ask an adult, “May I kill you?” the person will shout “No!” If you ask an infant that same question, the child will have no comprehension of what you’ve asked; that, however, is not license to kill the child. And yet, by Peter’s own admission, newborn infants aren’t persons of moral standing. He estimated that it isn’t until a child is six or nine months old, post birth, that they adequately meet his criteria of personhood. The implications, by his worldview, that such an infant could be killed as a result, should be very troubling to people. On the contrary, the position I hold is that we ought to treat our children kindly, no matter how developed their inherent capacities are or are not.
Fourth, when non-human animals are found to have higher-functioning and this prompts humans to want to protect them, it is the entirety of the other species that is protected—not just the adults. I think, for example, of the sperm whale. Several years ago, Readers Digest Canada published an article entitled “Why Whales Are People Too.” In it, it cites a group of scientists and ethicists who met in Vancouver, Canada, which led to the creation of the “Declaration of Rights for Cetaceans: Whales and Dolphins.” That declaration isn’t protecting only adult whales; instead, it’s protecting all the animals which fall into the category of cetaceans, which includes the itty-bitty pre-born embryonic and fetal cetacean babies. Proof of that is with Article 1 which doesn’t discriminate based on age or developmental level and instead says, “Every individual cetacean has the right to life.” This shows that where certain characteristics or qualities are valued, it is the inherent capacity for such qualities, not a current capacity, that result in a species being protected. By that logic, then, since pre-born humans have the inherent capacities Peter has chosen to prioritize, pre-born humans ought to be protected.